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Abstract 
Imperial chancellor Bismarck’s system of social insurance (with its three pillars 
health, accident and pension insurance) was an important role model for social 
security systems across Europe and in the US. How the introduction of the German 
system changed economic expectations and decisions of the German workforce has 
not been researched, though. This article tries to close this gap by analyzing the 
development of Prussian savings banks’ deposits in the late 19th century. The 
introduction of social security can affect private savings in at least two different 
ways: on the one hand, it might induce households to reduce their precautionary 
savings; one the other hand, it might give people a reason to reflect on their financial 
needs at old age or when sick, thereby increasing their motivation to accumulate 
private savings. To identify the causal effect of social insurance on private savings 
in Prussia, we employ a difference-in-difference-like approach. We show that, in 
our example, social security crowded out private savings considerably. 
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2 
Introduction 
Germany’s system of social insurance with its three pillars health, accident and pension 
insurance that were established by Imperial chancellor Otto von Bismarck in the 1880s was an 
important role model for social security systems across Europe and in the US. In 1957, however, 
the German minister for economic affairs Ludwig Erhard predicted the imminent end of the 
traditional German system because he was strongly convinced that steadily rising per-capita 
income would soon enable prudent households to increase their precautionary savings solely 
on the basis of their own responsibility (Erhard, 1957, p. 254). This prediction turned out to be 
a blatant miscalculation. In that same year chancellor Konrad Adenauer enforced a new German 
pensions act that automatically linked pension levels to economic growth thereby raising the 
West German welfare state to a whole new level.1 In the following national election, for the 
first and only time, Adenauer’s conservative party CDU won with the absolute majority of 
votes. 
Erhard’s arguments in favor of a termination of the traditional social insurance system 
still provide important insights into the reasons why this system had been introduced in the first 
place. In the early 1880s, Bismarck and his political advisers assumed that German (blue-collar) 
workers lacked both the economic capacity and the rational foresight to provide independently 
for life risks such as old age, illness or invalidity. That is why they decided to force workers to 
do what was good for them by establishing compulsory social insurance.2 Interestingly enough, 
similar paternalistic arguments had motivated the introduction of savings banks in the early 
nineteenth century. In particular, savings banks were thought to teach poor people the value of 
saving (Ashauer, 1998, p. 57). 
If the German savings banks fulfilled their educational mission, the question arises 
whether (and to what extent) the establishment of Bismarck’s system of compulsory social 
insurance actually changed workers’ voluntary savings. In theory, social security can affect 
private savings in at least two different ways (Feldstein, 1974). On the one hand, if households 
aim for a certain amount of total savings, the introduction of compulsory social insurance might 
induce them to reduce their voluntary precautionary savings. On the other hand, the introduction 
of compulsory social insurance might give people a reason to reflect on their financial needs at 
                                                          
1 See Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Rechts der Rentenversicherung der Arbeiter vom 23. Februar 1957, 
Bundesgesetzblatt I (1957), pp. 45-87; Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Rechts der Rentenversicherung der 
Angestellten vom 23. Februar 1957, Bundesgesetzblatt I (1957), pp. 88-131. 
2 See Kaiserliche Botschaft vom 17. November 1881, Abhandlungen des Reichstags, V. Legislaturperiode, Erste 
Session, 1881, pp. 1-3. 
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old age or when sick, thereby also increasing their motivation to build up larger private savings 
accounts. 
Based on information about savings banks’ deposits in more than 400 Prussian districts 
in the decades before the First World War we will analyze which of these effects dominated in 
the later nineteenth century. To establish causality, we make use of the fact that many 
occupations were not affected by the introduction of Bismarck’s social security system and 
could therefore be used as a control group, such as miners and public servants who already had 
a functioning social security system since the middle of the nineteenth century, and self-
employed persons who were not covered by any compulsory social insurance in the period 
under observation. We employ a difference-in-difference-like approach and show that, in 
Prussia, social security crowded out workers’ private savings considerably. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship between social 
security and private savings on the basis of the theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 
provides information about the historical development of both savings banks and social 
insurance in Prussia. In this section, we also elaborate the basic idea of our identification 
strategy. Section 4 introduces the data. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
Related literature 
In the early 1950s, Franco Modigliani and his student Richard Brumberg3 developed 
the life cycle hypothesis of saving which assumes that individuals save during their working 
years to secure a certain consumption level after their retirement. In his seminal paper, Martin 
Feldstein (1974) raises the question whether the introduction of compulsory social insurance 
affects an individual’s decision-making about her private savings under the life cycle 
hypothesis. He assumes a strong substitution effect between these two types of old-age 
provision. Given that an individual’s preferred consumption level at old age does not change 
with the introduction of social insurance, she will reduce her private savings in the amount of 
her expected pension claims. In contrast to this view, Philipp Cagan (1965) and George Katona 
(1965) suggest that pensions and private savings are complements rather than substitutes. 
Cagan (1965) stresses the role of the so-called recognition effect. In his opinion, the 
introduction of social insurance might give people for the first time a reason to consider their 
financial needs at old age (or when sick or disabled after a work-related accident), thereby 
                                                          
3 Because of the untimely death of Brumberg in August 1954, their joint paper was never published. See Ando 
and Modigliani (1963). 
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increasing their motivation to build up private savings. It is the assumed life cycle myopia of 
workers which is generally used to justify the introduction of paternalistic social security 
systems of the Bismarckian type (Feldstein/Liebman, 2002, p. 2269).4 Katona (1965) assumes 
that people with low income usually do not save because getting to a level of savings that would 
allow for an adequate consumption at old age seems out of reach. After the introduction of 
compulsory social insurance which is partly financed by employers and public subsidies, 
however, poor people expect to receive pension payments that finance a great deal of their 
consumption at old age (or when being incapacitated for work). That is why they now have 
incentives to build up additional private savings in order to bridge the remaining (and 
comparably small) shortfall in future consumption. Agreeing with Katona’s hypothesis, 
Johnson (1984) claims that British working class people started saving for old age only after 
the liberal government had introduced (in 1908) a tax-financed and means-tested pension for 
people older than 70. 
Similar to Johnson’s approach scholars usually focus on major political reforms when 
trying to identify the impact of social insurance on private savings. Kantor and Fishback (1996), 
for example, focus on the introduction of workers’ compensation in American states in the 
1910s. They estimate that this institutional change caused private savings to fall by about one 
quarter. Cutler and Gruber (1996) address the substitution between social and private insurance. 
They show that the expansion of Medicaid to pregnant women and children in the late 1980s 
crowded out private health insurance in the US by about 50 percent of the increase in coverage. 
Andersson and Eriksson (2015) claim that the introduction of a compulsory public pension 
system in Sweden in 1914 reduced the demand for life insurance significantly but had no 
measurable effect on private savings at banks. 
Surprisingly enough, researchers have long neglected the German experience. This only 
changed with Beatrice Scheubel (2013) who explores the substitution between social security 
and a very particular type of old age provision, that is getting many children. Like other 
industrialized countries Germany experienced a pronounced period of fertility decline at the 
turn of the previous century when the total fertility rate fell from about 5.5 children per woman 
in 1885 to less than 2.5 in the 1920s. Scheubel (2013) argues that the introduction of the social 
security system in the 1880s played a larger role in this development than is usually assumed. 
Her main argument is that pension insurance fully decoupled the motive to provide for old age 
from the decision to have children. In economic terms, compulsory public insurance crowded 
                                                          
4 In a poor relief system, workers are discouraged to save because they are forced to spend all their savings 
before they will be entitled to state support. That is another reason why private savings might increase after 
the introduction of social security. 
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out any type of investment in private insurance: Employees that became subject to social 
insurance contributions reduced both private savings for old age and the number of children 
who were traditionally supposed to support their old and disabled parents. In Scheubel’s 
opinion, the latter substitution effect was intensified by the externalities of the pay-as-you-go 
system in which the children of other people have to pay for the pensions of childless people. 
To test her hypotheses empirically Scheubel relies on cross-sectional observations of 
the demographic development in the 41 regions (Regierungsbezirke) of the German Empire 
between 1878 and 1914. Her identification strategy makes use of the fact that the extent to 
which the population was covered by the newly-introduced social pension insurance differed 
across German provinces and over time. She employs a difference-in-difference approach in 
which the treatment group consists of all provinces where the share of insured people was 
higher than the sample mean plus one standard deviation. Her conclusion is that up to a third of 
the observable decline in crude birth rates was determined by the introduction and extension of 
the pension system. Measuring industrialization by the share of population working in mining 
Scheubel (2013, p. 158) claims that this factor had an independent negative effect on fertility 
too. We think that this deduction is misleading. Tobias Jopp (2013) shows that German miners 
had been covered by a sector-specific pension system (very similar to the Bismarckian one) 
already since the middle of the nineteenth century and therefore faced incentives to reduce their 
number of children long before the other industrial workers. That is why the share of miners 
and other compulsory insured people can help to identify German regions with a very early 
treatment. In the next section, we will use this insight to develop a more refined difference-in-
difference-like approach to analyze the impact of social security on private savings in Prussian 
districts. 
 
Institutional change 
Inspired by experiences with earlier financial institutions like pawnshops and orphans’ 
funds, the first German savings banks were founded in the northern parts of the country, namely 
in Hamburg (1778), Oldenburg (1786), Kiel (1796), and Altona (1801) (Wysocki, 1980, p. 24). 
In Prussia, where municipal savings banks dominated from the beginning, the first savings bank 
was established in Berlin in 1818 (Ashauer, 1998). By 1913, the number of savings banks had 
risen to 1765 in Prussia and 3133 in the whole German Empire (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1976, 
pp. 63 f). Measured by their share in the total assets of all German financial institutions in the 
year 1913, savings banks represented with 24.8 percent the largest group of banks, closely 
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followed by incorporated credit banks with 24.2 percent and mortgage banks with 22.8 percent 
(Guinnane, 2002, p. 81).5 
The original purpose of savings banks was to provide poor people with the opportunity 
to build up funds that could be used in times of need. For that reason, some savings banks 
defined their target group very precisely. The savings bank of Trier, for example, which was 
located in the Prussian Province Rhineland, planned to accept as depositors only day laborers, 
domestic servants, soldiers up to the rank of non-commissioned officers, and public servants 
who earned less than 12 thalers per month (Ashauer, 1998, p. 55).6 However, many savings 
banks did not adhere to their founding principles and also accepted wealthier customers. Other 
savings banks explicitly opened up to all locals regardless of their income level. It is therefore 
not surprising that, in the nineteenth century, the lowest social strata accounted for only about 
40 to 50 percent of all savings bank books, with an even lower share in savings banks’ total 
deposits (Wysocki, 1980, pp. 76-83). 
Yet, executives of the savings banks feared that the introduction of Bismarck’s social 
security system with its three pillars health insurance (1883)7, accident insurance (1884)8 and 
pension insurance (1889)9 would crowd out private savings (Ashauer (1998, p. 72). The three 
pillars of the new social security system had in common that they insured all industrial blue-
collar workers and those white-collar workers whose annual earnings did not exceed 2000 
marks. With respect to insurance benefits, the health insurance provided sick pay and medical 
treatment for up to thirteen weeks. The accident insurance law required that an injured worker 
received all medical care free of charge.10 The law also included further mandatory benefits 
based on the worker’s income at the time of the accident. A permanently disabled worker, for 
instance, received two thirds of his last earnings as a pension. Widows and orphans were 
entitled to a survivor’s pension. According to the legal rules of the pension insurance, workers 
obtained an old-age pension after reaching the age of 70. This pension payment was not meant 
                                                          
5 Burhop (2002) finds a significant positive relationship between the German savings banks’ financial depth and 
Germany’s real capital stock for the period 1883 to 1913. This result implies that the savings banks’ role in 
financing Germany’s small and medium-sized industry was more important than hitherto assumed. See also 
Proettel (2013). 
6 See also the statues of the early savings banks in Hamburg or Oldenburg published in Wysocki (1980, pp. 198-
200). The savings banks’ lending business is described in Proettel (2013). 
7 The health insurance came effective in December 1884. See Gesetz betreffend der Krankenversicherung der 
Arbeiter vom 15. Juni 1883 (Reichsgesetzblatt (1883), pp. 73-104). 
8 The accidence insurance came in force in October 1885. See Unfallversicherungsgesetz vom 6. Juli 1884 
(Reichsgesetzblatt (1884), pp. 125-133). 
9 The pension insurance became effective in January 1891. See Gesetz betreffend die Invaliditäts- und 
Altersversicherung vom 22. Juni 1889 (Reichsgesetzblatt (1889), pp. 97-144). 
10 Guinnane and Streb (2015) show that a more consistent use of the rules and the limited incentives available 
under the accident insurance law would have reduced industrial accidents earlier and more extensively. 
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to cover the full cost of living but should only compensate for the drop in income that elderly 
workers had to accept due to their decreasing labor productivity. 
The three pillars of social insurance differed considerably with regard to their funding. 
Employers had to finance all of the expenses of the accident insurance, two thirds of the costs 
of the health insurance, and half of the financial obligations of the pension insurance. Workers’ 
pay checks were reduced to cover the remainder in each case. In addition, the central 
government subsidized the pension insurance by providing a grant of 50 marks per insured. 
Ashauer (1998, p. 72) claims that German savings banks’ worries proved wrong. In his 
view, the introduction of social insurance in the 1880s could simply not crowd out private 
savings because most workers did not save for old age or invalidity but rather for specific 
consumption needs. Even though Wysocki (1980, p. 88) observes that workers’ individual 
savings deposits were often high enough to cover the living expenses for a whole year, he also 
does not believe that workers voluntarily saved for retirement or long periods of sickness. Given 
the impressive increase of savings banks’ total deposits that grew in Germany from 2.6 billion 
in 1880 to 19.7 billion marks in 1913, and in Prussia from 1.6 billion to 13.1 billion marks 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1976, pp. 63 f), both historians felt the need to deny any substitution 
effect between private savings and social security. 
The eightfold increase in savings banks’ total deposits in the three decades before the 
First World War has a lot to do with the fact that both the number of potential savers and the 
individual saving capacity grew considerably in this period. In the German Empire, population 
rose between 1880 and 1913 by about 50 percent, real wages by about 60 percent 
(Rothenbacher/Fertig, 2015, Pierenkemper, 2015). However, this growth-driven increase in 
savings activities might obscure that, at the same time, social security crowded out private 
savings. 
Our identification strategy follows a similar logic as a standard difference-in-difference 
approach. Ideally, we would like to compare the individual savings activities of the newly-
insured industrial workers with the savings activities of other people who were potential savers 
but not affected by Bismarck’s social security system policy, either because they already had 
compulsory insurance or because they were not covered by the new laws. Note, however, that 
we do not have detailed data about individual Prussian households. That is why we cannot 
contrast the savings activities of households that were (voluntarily or compulsorily) insured 
against major life risks with those that were not insured. Based on statistical information about 
the geographic distribution of different occupational groups we instead focus on comparing 
savings activities of Prussian districts that differ with respect to their share of persons that were 
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most likely affected by Bismarck’s social policy. To do this as exactly as possible we have to 
consider which other occupational groups were already compulsorily insured in our period of 
observation and which groups were not covered by Bismarck’s new social security system. To 
begin with, miners had already been subject to compulsory social insurance since the middle of 
the nineteenth century. In 1854 the Prussian government established industry-specific social 
insurance carriers (so-called Knappschaften) that insured miners against income losses due to 
temporary sickness, permanent invalidity, and survivorship of a miner’s spouse and children.11 
Since every miner became unfit for mining sooner or later and therefore entitled to a life-long 
invalidity pension, Jopp (2013, p. 58) argues that Knappschaften implicitly provided old-age 
pensions. The replacement rates of the miners’ social insurance system were relatively 
generous. The invalidity pension came to about 10 to 30 percent of miners’ average income, 
the daily sick pay amounted to about 30 to 50 percent of miners’ daily wages (Jopp, 2013, p. 
141). 
If miners considered social security and private savings as close substitutes, we would 
assume that they saved significantly less than other workers who could not hope for sick pay or 
invalidity pension until the introduction of Bismarck’s compulsory social security system. 
Beginning in the 1880s, however, when all workers were treated equally with respect to social 
security, we would expect private savings of miners and other industrial workers to converge.  
Farm workers were soon defined as compulsory members both of the accident insurance 
and the pension insurance.12 However, this occupational group remained excluded from 
Bismarck’s health insurance until 1911. Sector-specific social insurance for self-employed 
farmers was introduced later in the twentieth century, namely accident insurance13 in 1939, 
pension insurance14 in 1957, and health insurance15 in 1973.16 Domestic servants who had been 
one of the major target groups of the early savings banks were for a long time only included in 
the pension insurance. Since 1911, they were also accepted by the health insurance. As already 
mentioned above, white-collar workers with an annual income below 2000 marks were treated 
                                                          
11 For the history of Prussian miners’ social security system, see Guinnane and Streb (2011) and Jopp (2011, 
2012, 2013). 
12 See Gesetz betreffend die Unfall- und Krankenversicherung der in land- und forstwirtschaftlichen Betrieben 
beschäftigten Personen vom 5. Mai 1886 (Reichsgesetzblatt (1886) pp. 132-178). 
13 See Fünftes Gesetz über Änderungen in der Unfallversicherung vom 17. Februar 1939 (Reichsgesetzblatt 
(1939) pp. 267-275). 
14 See Gesetz über die Altershilfe für Landwirte vom 27. Juli 1957 (Bundesgesetzblatt I (1957) pp. 1063-1068). 
15 See Gesetz über die Krankenversicherung der Landwirte vom 10. August 1972 (Bundesgesetzblatt I (1972) pp. 
1433-1458). 
16 Self-employed persons outside the agricultural sector can voluntarily apply for compulsory membership in 
the German social insurance system since 1972. See Rentenreformgesetz vom 16. Oktober 1972 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I (1972) pp. 1965-1997). 
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like blue-collar workers. Only in 1912, did white-collar workers with an annual income above 
2000 marks also become compulsory members of the social insurance system.17 Public 
servants, however, had benefited from preferential treatment already since 1825 when the 
Prussian government had entitled them to old age pensions and sick pay.18 Even though, 
Prussian public servants were not members of a compulsory social insurance system in a legal 
sense, they were in an economic sense because, like the Prussian miners, they were not forced 
to build up private savings in order to provide for life risks. 
To sum up, this short review of social security legislation suggests that we should 
distinguish three different groups in the following quantitative analysis of savings activities in 
Prussian districts: 
1) employees with the highest likelihood not to change their saving behavior after 
the introduction of Bismarck’s social security system either because they were 
already compulsorily insured (miners and public servants) or because they were not 
covered by the new law (self-employed persons) (group 1);19 
2. all other employees who became compulsory members of one or more pillars of 
Bismarck’s social security system sometime between the 1880s and the First World 
War (group 2);20 
3. persons who had no personal income and were therefore reliant on the economic 
support of the household’s breadwinner such as housewives, children and elderly 
persons (group 3). 
We define the second group as our treatment group that is the group of savers that was 
most likely affected by the introduction of Bismarck’s social security system. Note the 
following caveats. 
Some of the employees who were part of the second group could have been voluntarily 
insured before the 1880s. They could have joined local social security funds that were founded 
(and financed) by some employers, municipalities, or charities. They could also have bought 
life insurance that was already offered by private insurance companies (Borscheid, 1988). We 
consider none of these possibilities because of missing data. 
                                                          
17 See Versicherungsgesetz für Angestellte vom 20. Dezember 1911. 
18 See Preußisches Pensionsreglement für die Civil-Staatsdiener vom 30. April 1825. 
19 Group 1 includes persons without profession (category 24 of the Prussian occupation census of 1882), that is 
persons whose income was generated by capital assets as well as persons who lived in governmental facilities 
such as mental institutions or prisons. 
20 Group 2 also comprises the comparatively small group of persons whose occupation was not known 
(category 23 of the Prussian occupation census of 1882). 
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As long as they belonged to a working class household the dependents in group 3 were 
also affected by Bismarck’s social security system. Since the newly-established social 
insurance promised economic support when the breadwinner became sick, disabled or died, 
dependents now faced less incentive to build up their own savings deposits in order to provide 
for major life risks. The statistics do not reveal, however, which share of the absolute number 
of dependent people were part of the newly-treated households of industrial workers. If at all, 
children or housewives of more wealthy families held their own savings accounts (Wysocki, 
1980, p. 77 f). That is why, we abstain from adding the third group to the actual treatment group 
of employed workers. Instead, we will distinguish below between cases where dependents 
belonged to the reference population of potential savers and where they did not. 
Finally, we do not know the exact date of the beginning of the treatment of the second 
group. The earliest possible treatment year is 1881 when Bismarck explained his plan to 
establish a social security system in the Reichstag (German parliament). This public 
announcement might have already affected workers’ long-term expectations and therefore their 
savings activities. The latest possible treatment year is 1891 when the pension insurance law 
became effective. Workers might have changed their savings behavior only after they had 
actually started to contribute to the pension insurance. To deal with this methodological 
imprecision we experiment with different treatment years in our quantitative analysis. 
 
Data 
The Prussian statistical yearbook (Zeitschrift des Königlich Preußischen Statistischen 
Landesamt) regularly provided a detailed statistical description of the business activities of the 
Prussian savings banks. For most of the years in our observation period, however, this 
information has been aggregated on the level of the 13 Prussian provinces or the 35 
Regierungsbezirke, the middle administrative level of the Prussian state. Only for some years, 
the statistics offer data about every single Prussian savings bank including its number of savings 
accounts and total deposits. In our observation period, these data are available for the eight 
calendar years 1874, 1875, 1882, 1888, 1897, 1898, 1903, and 1904.21 To get a more 
disaggregated picture of the geographical distribution of savings activities across Prussia we 
assigned each individual savings bank to its appropriate district (in the borders of 1871) which 
is the lower administrative level of the Prussian state. 
                                                          
21 The data are published in the volumes 1876, 1884, 1890, 1900 and 1906 of the Zeitschrift des Königlich 
Preußischen Statistischen Landesamt. 
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As a result, we observe savings activities in up to 436 Prussian districts for eight 
benchmark years in the period from 1874 to 1904. Three years (1874, 1875, 1882) lie before 
the introduction of the first pillar of Bismarck’s social security system (health insurance in 
1883), five years (1888, 1897, 1898, 1903, 1904) cover the period afterwards. Wysocki (1980, 
p. 84) notes that the average German saver made only one or two deposits at her savings bank 
per year. In the interim, private savings were accumulated at home. Given the low frequency of 
individual bank payments our annual data seem to be sufficient to identify the impact of social 
security on private savings in the late nineteenth century. Although not codified in each and 
every statute, savings banks usually only accepted savers that lived in the boundaries of the 
district where the respective savings bank was located. That is why local savings deposits are a 
good indicator for the local propensity to save. 
 
Figure 1 Savings banks’ deposits per capita in Prussian districts, 1882 
  
 
Figures 1 and 2 show that both the amount of savings banks’ deposits per capita and the 
number of savings banks per capita were by no means equally distributed across Prussian 
districts. The highest savings activities can be found in the Regierungsbezirke Schleswig, 
Hannover, Westphalia and Rhineland. In the Eastern provinces of Prussia, savings activities 
were comparatively low. Ashauer (1998, p. 56) suggests that these differences can be explained 
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by cultural peculiarities. People from northern Schleswig were known as particularly “thrifty” 
(or even stingy); people from the Rhineland were “venturous”, and the inhabitants of the 
province Posen in the east had a low “sense of security” and therefore shied away from 
entrusting a bank with their money. Notwithstanding Ashauer’s cultural explanation, it is clear 
that we do not observe the geographical distribution of Prussian districts’ total savings as we 
do not have information about, for example, households’ cash hoarding or savings at other 
financial institutions such as credit cooperatives or insurance companies. Regional differences 
in savings banks’ deposits per capita might (partly) result from the use of different forms of 
saving and not from different culture-driven propensities to save. However, this problem should 
not affect our results as we focus on changes and not on the absolute level of savings banks’ 
deposits at the district level. 
 
Figure 2 Savings banks per capita in Prussian districts, 1882 
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Information about the distribution of employees across occupational groups are taken 
from the ifo Prussian Economic History Database (Becker et al, 2014). The original source for 
these data is the Prussian occupation census of 1882.22 Figure 3 shows how our treatment group 
(employees that were neither miners nor public servants) was distributed across Prussia. 
 
Figure 3 The “newly treated”: Group 2 in percentage of total population in Prussian 
districts, 1882 
 
  
Naturally, the share of newly-treated savers (group 2) was comparatively small in the 
Prussian regions with rich deposits of coal and nonferrous metals where miners were 
concentrated, namely in the provinces Rhineland, Westphalia, Saxony, and Silesia. Measured 
by income tax revenues per capita, these Prussian provinces were also among the most 
advanced in economic terms (Cinnirella/Streb, 2016). Before the introduction of Bismarck’s 
social security system, relative savings activities in miners’ districts were therefore subject to 
two countervailing influences. On the one hand, given a constant marginal propensity to save, 
miners (and other workers in these districts) might have saved more because they had a higher 
average income at their disposal than the people in the less developed non-mining districts. On 
                                                          
22 We assume that, within districts, the distribution of these occupational groups did not significantly change in 
the following two decades. 
14 
the other hand, miners might have had a comparatively low marginal propensity to save (and 
saved less than non-miners) because they were already entitled to invalidity pensions and sick 
pay. We will disentangle these two effects in the next section.  
Table 1 presents the mean value and standard variation for our main dependent and 
explanatory variables. The additional control variables were taken from the “Galloway Prussia 
Database 1861 to 1914”.23 We control for the share of old (above 70 years) and the share of 
young people in a district’s population. We assume that workers’ savings were lower the more 
dependent people they had to provide for.24 We further control for the share of women in a 
district’s population thereby accounting for potential gender specific differences in risk 
aversion and preference for saving. Because urban populations often had higher incomes, we 
also include the share of population that lived in cities. Since we cover a relatively short period 
of 29 years, we suppose that other factors which might affect savings activities such as religion 
or culture remain constant and are therefore captured in the fixed effects.25 
In the late nineteenth century, Prussia’s industrialization came along with a steady 
growth in real income. All other things equal, we would expect individual savings to increase 
parallel to real disposable income. To control for this general income effect, we employ year 
dummies. In addition, we make use of a time series of German real income provided by Rainer 
Gömmel (1974 [2004]). 
                                                          
23 See Galloway (2007). His data are not available for all years. That is why we matched Galloway’s data for the 
year 1875 with our data on saving banks for the years 1874 and 1875. Saving banks’ data from 1882 were 
associated with Galloway’s data from the same year and the year 1880; saving banks’ data for 1888 with 
Galloway’s data from 1890. Saving banks’ data for the years 1897 and 1898 are matched with Galloway’s data 
from the year 1900; saving banks’ data for the years 1903 and 1904 with Galloway’s data for 1905. 
24 This assumption is in line with the life cycle hypothesis that assumes that old people dis-save. 
25 Savings banks’ interest rates hardly changed over time and ranged between 2.5 and 4.5 percent (Ashauer, 
1998, p. 58). The fact that interest rates were generally higher in the Western provinces of Prussia is covered by 
the district fixed effects. 
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16 
Empirical analysis 
We analyze the impact of social security on private savings at the level of Prussian 
districts with the help of seven alternative measures for the dependent variable, all in natural 
logarithm.26 Most importantly, we consider as dependent variables the amount of savings 
banks’ deposits (lnsavings), savings banks’ deposits per capita (lnsavingspop), and savings 
banks’ deposits per household (lnsavingshh). In addition, we use information about the number 
of savings accounts, again in absolute numbers (lnaccounts), per capita (lnaccountspop) and 
per household (lnaccountshh). Finally, we look at a district’s number of savings banks per 
capita (lnbankspop). By comparing savings activities of Prussian districts that differ with 
respect to their share of persons with a high likelihood to be affected by Bismarck’s social 
security system, our estimation strategy follows the same logic as a standard differences-in-
differences approach. The special feature of our method is the use of a continuous measure for 
the intensity of the treatment, thereby making better use of the variation in the data. Our main 
hypothesis is that, after the introduction of Bismarck’s social security system, savings grew 
more slowly in districts with a large share of newly-treated employees (group 2) than in districts 
with a comparatively small share of this group because in the former districts relatively many 
people started to replace private savings with social insurance. 
In our regression analysis we distinguish two potential treatment variables. The first 
treatment variable (T 1) relates the treatment group (group 2: employees that were neither 
miners nor public servants) to a district’s total population. We therefore assume that every 
person whether self-employed, employed, or economically dependent is a potential saver.  
 
T 1 = (group 2 / district’s population) * 100 
 
In contrast, the second treatment variable (T 2) is based on the assumption that only 
persons with their own income can actively make savings decisions. That is why housewives, 
children and other dependent persons (group 3) are not considered as potential savers and 
therefore excluded from the reference population in the denominator:27 
 
T 2 = (group 2 / (district’s population - group3)) * 100. 
 
                                                          
26 In some Prussian districts, there existed no savings banks at the beginning of our observation period. We 
therefore observe zero savings for some district-years. In order to keep these observations in the regression 
analysis, we increase every observation by one before taking the natural logarithm.  
27 The Pearson correlation coefficient of the treatment variables T 1 and T 2 is 0.8570. 
17 
To mark the beginning of the treatment period, we introduce the dummy variable 
Bismarck which equals one for all observation years after the year 1883, in which the first pillar 
of Bismarck’s social insurance, that is health insurance, was introduced.28 Our identification 
strategy focuses on the interaction between Bismarck and the treatment variables 1 or 2 
respectively. If social security indeed crowded out private savings, the coefficient of the 
interaction terms inter1 and inter2 should be negative. With respect to treatment variable 1, the 
results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Tables 4 and 5 present the regressions for treatment 
variable 2. 
To consider the fact that the introduction of Bismarck’s social security system played 
only a minor role in districts that were still dominated by agriculture we also run regressions 
that only included the 374 Prussian districts where the share of agricultural workers was below 
20 percent (see Tables 3 and 5). All our models are estimated with district fixed effects and 
clustered standard errors at the level of districts. 
                                                          
28 We also experimented with alternative beginning-of-the-treatment years. The year 1883, however, led to the 
comparatively best fit of our regression models. 
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Surprisingly enough, in all specifications, the dummy variable Bismarck is significantly 
and positively related to savings banks’ deposits, the number of savings accounts, and the 
number of savings banks. After the introduction of Bismarck’s social security system, in 
Prussia, more savings banks were founded, more people opened up a savings account, and 
households saved more than in the decade before. The positive relationship between Bismarck 
and the various dependent variables suggests the existence of an education effect in line with 
Cagan’s (1965) argument. Being forced to contribute to the social security funds might have 
taught Prussian workers to recognize the value of voluntary private savings. Alternatively, 
Katona (1965) would argue that it was the new prospect of getting an old age or invalidity 
pension that encouraged workers to save more in order to close the remaining gap in the 
envisaged future retirement income. A reason against the conclusion that social security and 
private savings were complements is that the year dummies which are otherwise positive and 
significant become insignificant with the introduction of the Bismarck dummy. This result 
implies that the Bismarck dummy also picks up the strongly increasing real wages since the 
1880s. 
With respect to the role of the interaction term our findings are less robust. However, 
we want to point out that the first three estimates in Table 3 clearly imply that the introduction 
of Bismarck’s social security system crowded out private savings in non-agricultural districts. 
In the specification that assumes that the only persons that could make saving decisions were 
people with their own income (Tables 4 and 5) the impact of the interaction term on savings 
activities is in general smaller but also more significant. Interestingly enough, the interaction 
term is positively related with the number of savings accounts per capita and per household. 
After the introduction of Bismarck’s social security system, Prussian workers might have 
opened up additional savings accounts because of an increased willingness to save but in total 
they saved less than they would have done without social security. 
One might argue that the negative interaction term with respect to savings deposits does 
not indicate crowding out but simply reflects the fact that, after 1882, the income of group 1 
rose faster than that of group 2. This was not the case. Gumbach and König (1957 [2005]) 
provide information on the development of wages in Imperial Germany. They show that the 
income of miners (in group 1) did not increase faster than that of industrial worker (in group 
2). Hoffmann’s (1961, pp. 492 f) estimates confirm this finding. Selgert (2013) studied living 
standards of public servants in the region Baden in the period 1780 to 1913. He finds that the 
relative position of public servants in the income distribution seemed to deteriorate from the 
second half of the 19th century onwards when blue collar workers’ real wages started to 
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increase while district magistrates’ remuneration stagnated or even decreased. On balance, 
these studies suggest that the income of group 2 grew at least as fast as the income of group 1. 
Contrary to our expectations, a high share of old people in a district’s total population 
is positively associated with savings banks’ total deposits. Obviously, old people had built up 
a considerable amount of private savings during their working life but they did not use most of 
it for actual consumption at old age, as Modigliani’s life cycle theory suggests. Our finding 
implies that a bequest motive was already operative. 
To get a better understanding about the timing of the treatment effect, in Table 6, we 
interact treatment variables 1 and 2 with every observed year. With regard to the dependent 
variable, we now focus on savings deposits per household (lnsavingshh). The sign of the year-
specific interaction terms’ coefficients is still positive albeit not significant in the year 1875 
which suggests that group 2 did not save comparatively less than group 1 before the introduction 
of Bismarck’s social security system. The year-specific interaction terms’ coefficients become 
robustly negative in 1888 and increase both in size and significance during the 1890s and early 
1900.29 Our finding that the crowding-out effect increased over time implies that Prussian 
workers needed time to understand the economic implications of compulsory social security. 
Only after experiencing that social insurance benefits were provided by the government as 
originally promised they did change their long-term expectations and saved less. 
In Table 6, we also include the German real income index provided by Gömmel (1974 
[2004]). The results show that private savings at savings banks indeed increased with rising 
prosperity. This “income effect” explains why both contemporaries and historians so far failed 
to recognize the crowding out effect that took place despite increasing savings in absolute terms. 
  
                                                          
29 As a robustness check, we ran a similar regression for the 35 Prussian Regierungsbezirke (regions) for which 
we have data for each year between 1878 and 1903. The results are similar but less significant. The regression 
table will be provided in the online appendix. 
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Table 6 The timing of the treatment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
Lnsavings 
hh 
Lnsavings 
hh 
Lnsavings 
hh 
Lnsavings 
hh 
Lnsavings 
hh 
Lnsavings 
hh 
Lnsavings 
hh 
Lnsavings 
hh 
 all districts if agrar<20 
  Treatment1 Treatment2 Treatment1 Treatment2 
                  
1875 * T 0.126 0.126 0.0791 0.0791 0.118 0.118 0.0755 0.0755 
 (0.228) (0.228) (0.0939) (0.0939) (0.265) (0.265) (0.113) (0.113) 
1882 * T 0.842 0.842 1.473*** 1.473*** -0.516 -0.516 0.674 0.674 
 (1.020) (1.020) (0.518) (0.518) (1.100) (1.100) (0.542) (0.542) 
1888 * T -0.265 -0.265 0.840 0.840 -2.014 -2.014 -0.137 -0.137 
 (1.255) (1.255) (0.733) (0.733) (1.338) (1.338) (0.774) (0.774) 
1897 * T -0.532 -0.532 0.923 0.923 -2.869* -2.869* -0.492 -0.492 
 (1.472) (1.472) (0.889) (0.889) (1.580) (1.580) (0.959) (0.959) 
1898 * T -1.282 -1.282 0.227 0.227 -3.601** -3.601** -1.299 -1.299 
 (1.468) (1.468) (0.884) (0.884) (1.587) (1.587) (0.952) (0.952) 
1903 * T -1.793 -1.793 -0.125 -0.125 -4.362** -4.362** -1.881* -1.881* 
 (1.577) (1.577) (0.972) (0.972) (1.726) (1.726) (1.051) (1.051) 
1904 * T -1.988 -1.988 -0.187 -0.187 -4.616*** -4.616*** -1.986* -1.986* 
 (1.577) (1.577) (0.977) (0.977) (1.722) (1.722) (1.052) (1.052) 
bismarck  1.352  1.097  1.768*  1.809 
  (0.849)  (1.056)  (0.923)  (1.175) 
shareurban -0.00714 -0.00714 -0.00860 -0.00860 -0.00387 -0.00387 -0.00483 -0.00483 
 (0.00719) (0.00719) (0.00735) (0.00735) (0.00726) (0.00726) (0.00739) (0.00739) 
Shareold 0.584*** 0.584*** 0.565*** 0.565*** 0.481*** 0.481*** 0.502*** 0.502*** 
 (0.0750) (0.0750) (0.0810) (0.0810) (0.0803) (0.0803) (0.0844) (0.0844) 
shareyoung 0.0329** 0.0329** 0.0370** 0.0370** 0.0201 0.0201 0.0219 0.0219 
 (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0165) 
Sharewomen -0.0279 -0.0279 -0.0291 -0.0291 -0.0185 -0.0185 -0.0232 -0.0232 
 (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0261) (0.0261) 
income_index 0.120*** 0.0664** 0.104*** 0.0598* 0.144*** 0.0733** 0.145*** 0.0724* 
 (0.0177) (0.0301) (0.0256) (0.0361) (0.0190) (0.0326) (0.0271) (0.0401) 
1875 0.0810 0.0810 0.0648 0.0648 0.0837 0.0837 0.0678 0.0678 
 (0.0642) (0.0642) (0.0615) (0.0615) (0.0718) (0.0718) (0.0707) (0.0707) 
1882 0.470* 0.524* -0.226 -0.182 0.742*** 0.812*** 0.183 0.255 
 (0.270) (0.279) (0.321) (0.332) (0.286) (0.296) (0.331) (0.341) 
1888 0.605** -0.369 0.113 -0.677 0.831*** -0.443 0.378 -0.924 
 (0.277) (0.584) (0.387) (0.741) (0.293) (0.641) (0.411) (0.847) 
1897 -0.317 -0.587* -0.715* -0.935** -0.265 -0.619* -0.732 -1.094** 
 (0.253) (0.299) (0.393) (0.450) (0.274) (0.327) (0.445) (0.514) 
1898 -0.00144 -0.272 -0.158 -0.378 0.0455 -0.308 -0.111 -0.473 
 (0.196) (0.243) (0.276) (0.332) (0.214) (0.268) (0.310) (0.379) 
1903 0.108  0.0878  0.141*  0.145  
 (0.0679)  (0.0845)  (0.0738)  (0.0940)  
constant -3.869*** -0.354 -2.777* 0.0762 -5.156*** -0.558 -5.205*** -0.503 
 (1.159) (1.958) (1.673) (2.348) (1.244) (2.120) (1.772) (2.606) 
         
observations 3,488 3,488 3,488 3,488 2,992 2,992 2,992 2,992 
R-squared 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.672 0.672 0.671 0.671 
number of districts 436 436 436 436 374 374 374 374 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The question remains whether this crowding-out effect was also economically 
significant. To get an idea about its magnitude we used model 5 of Table 6 to calculate the 
counterfactual savings per household that would have occurred if Bismarck’s social security 
system would not have been introduced – which means that we neglected all year-specific 
interaction terms. This counterfactual only covers the crowding-out effect but not the offsetting 
effect suggested by Cagan (1965) or Katona (1965). As explained above, we are not able to 
identify this latter effect with the help of the Bismarck dummy because this variable also 
captures some of the general increase in savings that was driven by real wage growth. Figure 4 
shows the results of this exercise. At the mean, savings per household in a counterfactual world 
without social security would have been more than 250 percent higher than savings per 
household in the actual world of the year 1904. Even if we consider the problem of the 
unobserved offsetting effect, it is clear that the crowding out effect is also economically 
significant. 
 
Figure 4 The magnitude of the crowding-out effect 
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Conclusion 
Politicians – both today and in the past – usually justify the introduction of compulsory 
social security systems with ordinary people’s incapacity to provide self-reliantly for life risks 
such as old age, invalidity, and sickness. This was also true when chancellor Bismarck 
introduced the German system of social insurance with its three pillars health, accident, and 
pension insurance in the 1880s, considered the birth of the modern welfare state. Opponents of 
the expansion of the welfare state argue that social security systems are paternalistic and crowd 
out prudent individuals’ precautionary measures and are therefore unnecessary. 
Analyzing the impact of social security on private savings in late-nineteenth century 
Prussia we found evidence for both views. The overall effect, however, seems to be negative. 
Our regression analysis suggests that the introduction of social security for large parts of the 
Prussian population crowded out private savings considerably. We can only speculate whether 
workers would have used their growing real wages to provide self-reliantly for life risks if 
Bismarck’s social security system would not have been established. Based on the data provided 
by Jopp (2016), we can estimate that, around 1900, the total value of a workers’ pension claim 
ranged between 1.500 and 2.500 marks (which equaled about two annual incomes). Actual 
savings did not come close. However, our counterfactual suggests that a worker with average 
wage would have saved about this amount in a world without Bismarck’s social security. 
This speculation does not consider the distribution of wages across Prussian workers. 
Even during prime industrialization, many workers might not have yet reached a level of 
disposable income that would have allowed sufficient individual provision for life risks. Thus 
Bismarck’s social insurance system might indeed have been needed to fight the misery workers 
and their families potentially faced in old age or sickness. 
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